fix(security): file storage authorization hardening

Three separate issues in the file storage layer:

1. IDOR via client-controlled object key in applicant.saveFileMetadata
   and file.replaceFile. Both procedures accepted `bucket` and `objectKey`
   from the client and stored them on a new ProjectFile row attached to
   the caller's own project. Because file.getDownloadUrl authorizes via
   `findFirst({ bucket, objectKey })` -> projectId, an attacker could
   bind another team's storage object to their own project row and then
   download the foreign object through the legitimate authorization
   path. Now both procedures require `bucket === BUCKET_NAME` and the
   `objectKey` to start with the project's sanitized title prefix
   (matches the prefix that generateObjectKey produces server-side).

   New helper `objectKeyBelongsToProject` exported from src/lib/minio.ts;
   `sanitizePath` is now exported as well so the helper can reuse it.

2. Missing per-round scope on file.getBulkDownloadUrls. The single-file
   getDownloadUrl restricts a juror to files in rounds with sortOrder
   <= their assigned round, but the bulk variant only checked that an
   Assignment row existed for the project. A juror assigned only to
   EVALUATION could pull URLs for LIVE_FINAL/DELIBERATION confidential
   files via this endpoint. Now applies the same per-round filter when
   the caller's access to the project is jury-only (mentors / team
   members / award jurors retain unrestricted access, matching
   getDownloadUrl semantics).

3. Same omission on the standalone /api/files/bulk-download REST route.
   Same fix applied there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Matt
2026-04-29 03:30:00 +02:00
parent 89e637843a
commit 9d0beed02f
4 changed files with 136 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@@ -30,21 +30,21 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
// Authorization: must be admin or assigned jury/mentor for this project
const isAdmin = userRole === 'SUPER_ADMIN' || userRole === 'PROGRAM_ADMIN'
// Per-round scope: jurors may only pull URLs for files in rounds with
// sortOrder <= their assigned round. Mirrors file.getDownloadUrl. Without
// this, a juror assigned to EVALUATION could bulk-download LIVE_FINAL
// confidential files via this endpoint.
let priorRoundIds: string[] | null = null
if (!isAdmin) {
// Check if user is assigned as jury
const juryAssignment = await prisma.assignment.findFirst({
where: {
userId,
projectId,
},
where: { userId, projectId },
select: { id: true, roundId: true },
})
// Check if user is assigned as mentor
const mentorAssignment = await prisma.mentorAssignment.findFirst({
where: {
mentorId: userId,
projectId,
},
where: { mentorId: userId, projectId },
select: { id: true },
})
if (!juryAssignment && !mentorAssignment) {
@@ -53,14 +53,41 @@ export async function POST(request: NextRequest): Promise<NextResponse> {
{ status: 403 }
)
}
// Apply the per-round filter only when access is jury-only.
if (juryAssignment && !mentorAssignment) {
const assignedRound = await prisma.round.findUnique({
where: { id: juryAssignment.roundId },
select: { competitionId: true, sortOrder: true },
})
if (assignedRound) {
const priorOrCurrent = await prisma.round.findMany({
where: {
competitionId: assignedRound.competitionId,
sortOrder: { lte: assignedRound.sortOrder },
},
select: { id: true },
})
priorRoundIds = priorOrCurrent.map((r) => r.id)
}
}
}
// Fetch file metadata from DB
const files = await prisma.projectFile.findMany({
where: {
const fileWhere: Record<string, unknown> = {
id: { in: fileIds },
projectId,
},
}
if (priorRoundIds !== null) {
fileWhere.OR = [
{ requirement: { roundId: { in: priorRoundIds } } },
{ requirementId: null, roundId: { in: priorRoundIds } },
{ requirementId: null, roundId: null },
]
}
const files = await prisma.projectFile.findMany({
where: fileWhere,
select: {
id: true,
fileName: true,

View File

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ export async function deleteObject(
* Sanitize a name for use as a MinIO path segment.
* Removes special characters, replaces spaces with underscores, limits length.
*/
function sanitizePath(name: string): string {
export function sanitizePath(name: string): string {
return (
name
.trim()
@@ -164,3 +164,16 @@ export function generateMentorObjectKey(
return generateObjectKey(projectTitle, fileName, 'mentorship')
}
/**
* Verify a client-supplied object key actually belongs to a project's
* sanitized prefix. Used to prevent cross-tenant binding where an attacker
* passes another team's `bucket+objectKey` into a metadata-save procedure.
*/
export function objectKeyBelongsToProject(
objectKey: string,
projectTitle: string,
): boolean {
const sanitized = sanitizePath(projectTitle)
return objectKey.startsWith(`${sanitized}/`)
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import crypto from 'crypto'
import { z } from 'zod'
import { TRPCError } from '@trpc/server'
import { router, publicProcedure, protectedProcedure } from '../trpc'
import { getPresignedUrl, generateObjectKey, BUCKET_NAME } from '@/lib/minio'
import { getPresignedUrl, generateObjectKey, BUCKET_NAME, objectKeyBelongsToProject } from '@/lib/minio'
import { generateLogoKey, createStorageProvider, type StorageProviderType } from '@/lib/storage'
import { getImageUploadUrl, confirmImageUpload, getImageUrl, deleteImage, type ImageUploadConfig } from '@/server/utils/image-upload'
import { sendStyledNotificationEmail, sendTeamMemberInviteEmail } from '@/lib/email'
@@ -408,6 +408,24 @@ export const applicantRouter = router({
})
}
// Verify the client-supplied objectKey actually belongs to this project's
// sanitized prefix. Without this, a user could pass another team's
// bucket+objectKey here, attach it to their own project row, and then
// download the foreign object via file.getDownloadUrl (which authorizes
// by bucket+objectKey -> projectId).
if (input.bucket !== BUCKET_NAME) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: 'BAD_REQUEST',
message: 'Invalid file location',
})
}
if (!objectKeyBelongsToProject(input.objectKey, project.title)) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: 'BAD_REQUEST',
message: 'Invalid file location for this project',
})
}
// Block rejected projects
if (await isProjectRejected(ctx.prisma, input.projectId)) {
throw new TRPCError({ code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Your project has been rejected. File changes are no longer permitted.' })

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import { z } from 'zod'
import { TRPCError } from '@trpc/server'
import { router, protectedProcedure, adminProcedure } from '../trpc'
import { getPresignedUrl, generateObjectKey, deleteObject, BUCKET_NAME } from '@/lib/minio'
import { getPresignedUrl, generateObjectKey, deleteObject, BUCKET_NAME, objectKeyBelongsToProject } from '@/lib/minio'
import { logAudit } from '../utils/audit'
import { checkRequirementsAndTransition } from '../services/round-engine'
@@ -556,6 +556,28 @@ export const fileRouter = router({
})
}
// Verify the client-supplied objectKey actually belongs to this project's
// sanitized prefix. Without this check, a team member (or admin) could
// pass another project's bucket+objectKey here and bind it as a "new
// version" — then anyone with project access could read the foreign
// object via file.getDownloadUrl, which authorizes by bucket+objectKey.
const project = await ctx.prisma.project.findUniqueOrThrow({
where: { id: input.projectId },
select: { title: true },
})
if (input.bucket !== BUCKET_NAME) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: 'BAD_REQUEST',
message: 'Invalid file location',
})
}
if (!objectKeyBelongsToProject(input.objectKey, project.title)) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: 'BAD_REQUEST',
message: 'Invalid file location for this project',
})
}
// Create new file and update old file in a transaction
const result = await ctx.prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
const newFile = await tx.projectFile.create({
@@ -696,11 +718,18 @@ export const fileRouter = router({
.query(async ({ ctx, input }) => {
const isAdminOrObserver = ['SUPER_ADMIN', 'PROGRAM_ADMIN', 'OBSERVER', 'AWARD_MASTER'].includes(ctx.user.role)
// For non-admin/observer callers, mirror the per-round scope used by
// file.getDownloadUrl: a juror assigned to round N may only pull URLs
// for files in rounds with sortOrder <= N. Without this, a juror
// assigned to EVALUATION can bulk-download LIVE_FINAL/DELIBERATION
// confidential files via this endpoint.
let priorRoundIds: string[] | null = null
if (!isAdminOrObserver) {
const [assignment, mentorAssignment, teamMembership] = await Promise.all([
ctx.prisma.assignment.findFirst({
where: { userId: ctx.user.id, projectId: input.projectId },
select: { id: true },
select: { id: true, roundId: true },
}),
ctx.prisma.mentorAssignment.findFirst({
where: { mentorId: ctx.user.id, projectId: input.projectId },
@@ -724,6 +753,26 @@ export const fileRouter = router({
message: 'You do not have access to this project\'s files',
})
}
// Apply per-round filter only when the caller's access is jury-only.
// Mentors / team members / award jurors get unrestricted file access
// on the project (matches getDownloadUrl semantics).
if (assignment && !mentorAssignment && !teamMembership) {
const assignedRound = await ctx.prisma.round.findUnique({
where: { id: assignment.roundId },
select: { competitionId: true, sortOrder: true },
})
if (assignedRound) {
const priorOrCurrent = await ctx.prisma.round.findMany({
where: {
competitionId: assignedRound.competitionId,
sortOrder: { lte: assignedRound.sortOrder },
},
select: { id: true },
})
priorRoundIds = priorOrCurrent.map((r) => r.id)
}
}
}
// Get files
@@ -731,6 +780,17 @@ export const fileRouter = router({
if (input.fileIds && input.fileIds.length > 0) {
where.id = { in: input.fileIds }
}
if (priorRoundIds !== null) {
// Allow a file when:
// - it has a requirement whose round is in the allowed set, OR
// - it has no requirement and its roundId is in the allowed set, OR
// - it has neither requirement nor roundId (legacy general files)
where.OR = [
{ requirement: { roundId: { in: priorRoundIds } } },
{ requirementId: null, roundId: { in: priorRoundIds } },
{ requirementId: null, roundId: null },
]
}
const files = await ctx.prisma.projectFile.findMany({
where,